Article 2 of the ECHR regulates the right to life as a fundamental right that the deprivation of it shall be done in a certain threshold of necessity. In particular when the taken of life is done by the agents of states. This article examines the interpretation of article 2 by the European Court of Human Rights, especially when it is read in conjunction with state's positive obligations under article 1. The discussion will proceed in three sections: first, the review of the evolvement of the procedural requirements of article 2 in cases of deaths arising from the acts of state agents. Second, is the examination of whether the procedural requirements of article 2 can be used as a mean in securing the adequate protection of the right to life from arbitrary killing by the use of lethal force? Third, is an analysis of an effective legal system as a procedural requirement of article 2 in the case of homicide caused by the negligence of the authorities? Finally, this essay will conclude by examining the Court's position in its endeavors to achieve an appropriate balance between not over-burdening its Member States and securing the adequate protection of the right to life.
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to life is one of the most fundamental provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter 1 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 18984/91, § 53, 27 September 1995; Cakici v. Turkey, no. 23657/94, § 86, 8 July 1999; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 108, 4 May 2001; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, § 102, 4 May 2001; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, § 91, 4 May 2001; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, § 85, 4 May 2001; Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, § 172, 24 February 2005; Isayeva, and "ECHR"). 1 No deprivation of life can be conducted intentionally, except in certain conditions as stated in article 2 paragraph 2, which gives a privilege for states to take one's life if it is "absolutely necessary", Turkey, no. 22729/93, § 86, 19 February 1998; Ergi v. Turkey, no. 23818/94, § 82, 28 July 1998; Çakici v. Turkey (n 1); Tanrikulu v. Turkey, no. 23763/94, § 101, 8 July 1999; McKerr v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 111; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 105; Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 94; Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom (n 1) § 88; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 136, 13 June 2001; Ulku Ekinci v. Turkey, no. 27602/95, § 144, 16 July 2002; Hackett v of the use of force, identify and punish the offenders, and that it takes reasonable measures in securing evidence relating to the incident. 24 Any deficiency, such as the lack of independence, the lack of transparency, the failure to inspect the responsible officials, the absence of legal assistance for representing the victims' family, the failure to disclose the witness statements, and the delay in inquest proceedings that has impeded the public prosecutors from obtaining sufficient evidence in order to warrant prosecution, can be concluded as a violation of the The effectiveness of the investigation
As described in a previous section, the scope and content of an effective investigation consists of three aspects: i)
whether it can examine the legality of the use of force; ii) whether it can identify and punish the offenders, and iii) whether the investigation has been done reasonably in order to secure the evidence in the field.
From these elements it seems the Court places a high standard on the states if they are going to satisfy the requirements.
However, the Court's reiteration that duty to investigate is an obligation of means, not of result, tends to lessen the degree of responsibility. 42 There is not an absolute right of the applicants to gain a prosecution or conviction. 43 
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